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Abstract 
In this paper, using Bureau of the Census family income data we formally examine the income polarization 
hypothesis for the State of Connecticut. We ask and answer two questions.  First, did the polarization of 
income deteriorate over the Great Recession years of 2007-2009?  If the observed clustering around two 
opposite poles that existed in Connecticut prior to the Great Recession increased between the years 
immediately prior to the recession and immediately after (2006-2010) it would be consistent with the 
perception that the size of the middle class decreased over this period. Second, have income polarization 
and income inequality fared significantly differently during this period in the state? Income polarization and 
income inequality, albeit related, are generally distinct features of income distributions.  
 
There was no statistically significant change in the polarization of Connecticut’s income over the recent 
recessionary period.  We also find that income inequality and income polarization followed distinct and 
different trajectories over the time period examined. 
 
Keywords: Polarization, Wolfson Index, Inequality, Income distribution, Connecticut 
 
All the people like us are We, and everyone else is They. 
Rudyard Kipling, We and They (1926) 
 
1.0 Introduction 
According to official measures, the Great Recession ran from December 2007 through June 2009.  During 
the Great Recession the State of Connecticut saw a downturn across practically all of its economic sectors.  
It experienced a rise in unemployment, budget shortfalls, a stagnant housing-market and a deterioration of 
middle class jobs (Krzyek, 2012). And although the distributional consequences of the Great Recession on 
Connecticut were not examined in any great detail, State policymakers articulated and proposed taxation and 
                                                      
*Rodriguez, email: arodriguez@newhaven.edu; Lane, email: scott.lane@quinnipiac.edu; 
Rodriguez is corresponding author.  We thank John Rosen, Lesley DeNardis, Demissew Ejara, and Steven Shapiro for 
their valuable input.  
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social-welfare policies seeking to arrest or remedy the seeming harsher consequences of income polarization 
– aimed at remedying the lot of the “vanishing middle-class” (Stuart, 2011; Pazniokas, 2011).1   
 
There is now evidence of increased polarization of labor across the nation between high and low wage 
employment during this period(Autor D. , 2010; Moretti, 2012).  But to our knowledge, there was no state-
level basis for the policy positions and programs that Connecticut deployed at the time.2  The policy 
initiatives simply appeared to assume that the fortune of Connecticut’s middle class mirrored those of the 
nation.  As we explain later, this was far from being the case on multiple levels.  
 
A factual record improves the information available for individuals and for public opinion and constitutes a 
sounder basis for policy.  Thus, it is critical that we clearly understand the impact of the Great Recession on 
inequality and the polarization of income in the state of Connecticut especially before enacting policy.  This 
is the objective of this research, specifically for the state of Connecticut: to test the vanishing middle-class 
hypothesis.  We conduct formal statistical inference on the index of polarization by testing hypothesis about 
the changes in the values of the index over the years before, during and immediately after the Great 
Recession in Connecticut.  Succinctly, we find no statistically meaningful change in polarization over the 
Great Recession years.  We find distinct and different trends in polarization and inequality.  And we find in 
general the family incomes held or slightly increased until noticeable differences in polarization emerged in 
the years immediately after the recession: 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. 
 
This research is narrow in scope. It documents the presence of polarization, examines the performance of 
average family income levels disaggregated by income percentile and whether observed changes in the 
measure of polarization are statistically significant.  At this point, we can only offer conjectures as to the 
reasons for the observed patterns.  
 
All results, as well as the basis, methodology and the statistical tests underscoring our work are provided in 
this paper.  In the next section we describe the routine, incorrect confounding and conflating of income 
inequality and polarization in the popular media and among individuals.  The third section explains the 
difference between inequality and polarization.  In section four and five we describe our work and our 
results.  The last two sections conclude and in them we advance some tentative explanations for the 
observed results namely, that in Connecticut and contrary to public and official perceptions, income 
polarization did not increase.   
 
2.0 Framing the Debate 
In popular debates and discussion over the distribution of income, inequality frequently gets conflated with 
polarization and the terms are often used synonymously in common parlance.  But increased polarization 
and the deterioration of the distribution of income while related are not necessarily the same thing.  Societies 
are unequal if a small fraction of the population is much richer or wealthier than the rest. Yet, such societies 
are not polarized.  Polarization, which conveys a new perspective on the inequality debate, is an important 
and distinct dimension of the distribution of income.  If the distribution of income is compressed within 
groups within the state population but remains diverse or distant between groups, then we consider income 
                                                      
1
 The State of Connecticut passed an income tax increase (Senate Bill 1239) in May of 2011.  
 
2
 Although it is not clear to what extent it found an audience among policymakers a notable examination of 
distributional considerations is the report by Hero for the state of Connecticut (Hero, 2007).  For a similar look at New 
England see Gittel and Rudokas(Gittell & Rudokas, 2007).  
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“polarized” between the groups.  We explain the difference between polarization and inequality in more 
detail below.  
 
Despite distinct differences it is probably polarization that most people intuitively have in mind when they 
frown on inequality.  The anger displayed by the Occupy Wall Street - and its counterparts in Connecticut, 
Occupy New Haven and Occupy Hartford – during the Summer of 2012 vividly brought to our attention the 
marked differences between the “1%” and the “99%”.  The Occupy message reflected an intense 
disaffection with income inequality; but it was expressed and articulated with imagery reflecting a bi-
polarization of distinct income groups.  The demonstrations channeled growing resentment and concern at - 
the “erosion,” the “hollowing out,” of the middle class, the worsening of everyone’s general economic 
position and proffered a seemingly sensible explanation: the concentration of income in the top 1 percent of 
income earners.3 This simple categorization conforms to cognitive psychologists’ understanding of the 
human need to categorize – to assemble and understand the world in terms of groups and to attribute to all 
members of each grouping the typical or salient characteristics of a particular member of each group(Rosch, 
1978).  Within the heuristics literature it is well understood that disregarding information in favor of a ready 
or simple representation may be an optimal response to a complex environment (Gigerenzer, 2010).  Indeed, 
it is probably by framing the inequality debate as a contest between readily understandable identifiable and 
distinct clusters – the 1 percent and everybody else – that the Occupy movement influenced policy-makers 
and had an impact on the general public.   
 
Consider the following two Occupy Wall Street reports as archetypical examples.  Laurie Kellman, reporting 
on an Associated Press-Gfk poll taken at the time noted that “more than one-third of the country (37 percent) 
supports the Wall Street protests” (Kellman, 2011).  Similarly, Matthew Cooper, citing results that appeared 
in a United Technologies/National Journal Congressional Connection Poll observed the following: 
 
A new survey shows that Americans overwhelmingly support the self-styled Occupy Wall Street protests 
that not only have disrupted life in Lower Manhattan but also in Washington and cities and towns 
across the U.S. and in other nations. Some 59 percent of adults either completely agree or mostly agree 
with the protesters, while 31 percent mostly disagree or completely disagree; 10 percent of those 
surveyed didn't know or refused to answer.  What's more, many people are paying attention to the 
rallies. Almost two-thirds of respondents--65 percent--said they've heard "a lot" or "some" about the 
rallies, while 35 percent have said they've heard or seen "not too much" or "nothing at all" about the 
demonstrations (Cooper, 2011). 
 
In many instances - including matters of wealth and income - individuals differ on their values (e.g. the role 
of free agency, the role of the state), objectives and outcomes.  The Occupy outcry was influential in 
framing the issues underscoring the widening income distribution gap and evoking a shared mental model 
among individuals.  It succeeded where the copious amount of ink spilled in the ongoing debate over the 
distribution of income failed. It is a debate that commenced in earnest in the 1980’s – but one that has been 
relegated largely to academics, think tanks and policy wonks(Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Burkhauser, 
Larrimore, & Simon, 2012; Frank, 2009; Mankiw, 2013; Piketty & Saez, 2003).  Most individuals were (and 
are) hardly moved by the outcries in inequality in learned and academic journals replete with graphs, 
statistics and professional jargon as they were by the stark distinctions forged by the occupation of Zuccotti 
                                                      
3
 See, for example, USA Today, October 2011.  “Middle Class’ share of the nation’s income is shrinking.”(Bello & 
Overberg, 2011). 
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Park and other locales around the world.  The irony in all this is that an intuitive understanding of 
polarization raised people’s consciousness despite the fact that inequality was the focal point of the Occupy 
movement.  This is a subtle point perhaps, but as we will see an association neither altogether correct nor 
inconsequential. The next section elaborates on the distinction between inequality and polarization.  
 
3.0 Polarization and Income Inequality 
One can appraise the extent of polarization across any number of socio-economic characteristics such as 
race, education, wages, income and wealth.  The term refers to the extent to which the society is clustered 
into recognizably homogenous groupings.   
 
Consider the following distribution of household income St ranked over income deciles: 
 
St = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1,} 
 
The Gini coefficient of income inequality for the given distribution St is 0.2667.  Now consider a 
transformation that causes households with income of 5 to converge to 1, and the income of households with 
income of 1 to converge to 5.  We obtain the following changed distribution: 
 
St+1 = {5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 1, 4, 3, 2, 5,} 
 
A marked bi-polarization or clustering has emerged towards each end of the distribution – as can be 
observed. And although the increase in clustering appears to intuitively reflect an increase in what one 
understands as inequality, inequality – as measured by the Gini coefficient - has not changed; the Gini 
coefficient for distribution St+1 remains at 0.2667.  Technically, polarization can be perceived as signifying 
two aspects of distributional changes: “spreadoutness” and bimodality (Wolfson M. C., July 1997).  The 
concept of spreadoutness presumes to gauge the number of families with middle level income – because the 
distribution of income is spreading outwards in both directions away from the middle.  Relatedly, bimodality 
refers to the clustering of formerly middle level incomes at either higher or lower levels of the distribution. 
Polarization is said to exist when income is largely concentrated at both ends of the distribution, with less in 
the middle.  For example, distribution St+1 is said to be more polarized than distribution St because the 
distribution of income in St+1 is more bimodal in the sense that it contains more of the poor and of the rich – 
but fewer people in the middle.  It is in this sense, that the concept of polarization is also known as the 
“disappearing middle-class” phenomenon. 
 
3.1 Measuring Bi-Polarization 
Techniques for measuring polarization emerged in the early 1990’s largely out of concern primarily in 
western economies, over slow growth in middle class job creation (Wolfson M. C., 1994; Esteban & Ray, 
1994).  They found ready application in similar inquiries within individual developing nation-states and 
across nations (Hakim, 2002; Hegre, 2008; Brzezinski, 2011). 
 
The causes and consequences of the income gap drive an often contentious debate that continues unabated to 
this day and largely unsettled(Burkhauser, Larrimore, & Simon, 2012; Frank, 2009; Piketty & Saez, 2003).  
And it was within this context that scholars and commentators expressed concern that a disappearing middle 
class would further impair the growing inequality in the distribution of income. 
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Conventional inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient were unable to capture changes in the share of 
income held by middle-income groups. The Wolfson Polarization index gauges the degree of pure income 
polarization (Wolfson M. C., July 1997) . Specifically, the Wolfson index best frames bipolarization around 
the median, limiting the focus to two groups.  The Wolfson Index is derived from the Lorenz curve and 
measures twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line at the median point.  The Wolfson 
Index is expressed as follows: 
 
W(f) = 2µ/m [2[0.5 – L(0.5)] – G(f)] 
 
Where f is a functional representation the distribution of income and L the Lorenz Curve; and L(0.5) is the 
income share of the bottom half of the population.   µ and m are the median and mean income respectively.  
G is the Gini index.  
 
To appraise inequality we calculate the Gini Coefficient and its confidence interval using the same 
methodology.  The Gini is the most frequently used measure of inequality.  Specifically, the Gini is twice 
the area between 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve (Slottje, Basman, & Nieswiadomy, 1989).   The Gini 
Coefficient of inequality is defined as follows: 
 
 =   ()

 [1 − () / 
Where y be a vector of incomes with mean µ, extreme value ymin and ymax and cumulative distribution 
function F(y).  Following Giles (2002), the operational formulation is as follows: 
 
 =  ( )/


( )


  
 
Both expressions, the Wolfson and Gini Indexes, are available in the Distributive Analysis Stata Package 
(DASP) module(Araar & Duclos, 2012).  We utilize DASP routines to estimate the asymptotic variance and 
standard errors for the Wolfson and Gini indices.  The output provides confidence intervals for the indices.  
These statistics allow us to formally set forth and construct hypothesis tests about changes in the levels of 
the indices. 
.  
Our interest is primarily on the change in polarization over the time period examined.  Thus, our null 
hypothesis states that two different income distributions have the same value of the Wolfson Index.  We 
provide tests for several comparisons between subsequent years as well as comparisons to a base-year/index; 
results are in Table 5.   
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4.0 Household Income and the Polarization of Income in Connecticut 
 
We ask and answer two questions.  First, did the polarization of income deteriorate over the recent 
recession?  If the observed clustering around two opposite poles that existed in Connecticut prior to the 
recession increased between the years immediately prior to the recession and immediately after (2006-2010) 
it would be consistent with the perception that the size of the middle class decreased over this period. 
Second, have income polarization and income inequality fared differently in the state? Income polarization 
and income inequality, albeit related, are generally distinct features of income distributions. Importantly, we 
set forth tests of statistical significance to ensure that observed changes in inequality and polarization 
metrics are meaningful.   
 
We use Bureau of the Census family income data adjusted for household size and corrected for nominal 
changes to formally examine the polarization hypothesis for the State of Connecticut. Income is deflated by 
the square root of household size to account for economies of scale across the household.  Data for our 
analysis is from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the March Current Population 
Survey (CPS) – administered by the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The CPS is a 
representative sample of the civilian population.   It is commonly used to measure levels and trends in 
income and its distribution.  The data were obtained via the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series CPS 
data (IPUMS CPS) published by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.  We use 
the CPS-ASEC for 2005-2012.  The data are harmonized to be consistent over time.  
 
The analysis of income relies on reported family income.  The family is the primary unit across which 
income is shared.  Income data are adjusted to reflect 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index Research 
Series Using Current Methods (CPI-U-RS). 
 
4.1 Results 
Our data allow us to look at changes in the distribution of income in Connecticut over the period 2006-2010.  
It does not allow us to track particular families.  Rather, it provides a look at the overall distribution of 
income across Connecticut’s entire population. 
To facilitate the examination we break the population into groups – specifically, percentile groups.  The 
family at the 90th percentile of income has an income level higher than 90 percent of the population.  By the 
same logic, the family at the 10th percentile has income higher than only 10 percent of the population.  The 
50th percentile, commonly known as the median, represents the exact middle-income.  We report the 
recession’s effect through its two official years, 2008 and 2009 – as well as the three years after 2010, 2011 
& 2012.  In some tabulations we compare the recession to the income peak in 2007 and to a comparable two 
years beforehand – 2006, and 2005.   
The recession hit incomes across the distribution but not in an identical manner; certain groups felt its 
effects more strongly than others.  
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Table 1 
Family Income Percentiles 
Family Income ($) 
Percentile 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
10th Percentile 11,571 13,020 12,684 14,766 15,345 
25th Percentile 27,554 28,494 31,071 33,117 35,100 
Median 57,062 62,665 67,951 70,295 71,149 
75th Percentile 98,257 108,111 118,980 121,410 121,484 
90th Percentile 149,747 169,380 174,939 179,523 199,935 
Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census, Connecticut MSA’s.  
All figures in 2012 dollars. 
 
For example, family income increased by more than 6 percent for the richest families in the state – those at 
the 90th percentile.  Median family income – by comparison - increased by more than 12 percent during the 
recession.  Notably, the poorest segment of the population – those in the 10th percentile, exhibited a 13.3 
percent in income. 
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage change in income at several points in the income distribution in each year 
compared to the base year of 2005 – where all indexes are set equal to 100.  
 
Figure 1 
Percentage Change in Income across Percentiles 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census, Connecticut MSA’s.  
All figures in 2012 dollars.  (2005=100) 
 
4.2 The Income-Gap 
In Connecticut, the gap between lower- and upper-income has been markedly higher than in the rest of the 
nation.  However, the last recession had an atypical impact on the income gap.  A common way to examine 
the income gap is to look at the ratio of income for families at the top of the distribution to families at the 
bottom.  The graphs below display two standard income ratios: the ration of income at the 90th relative to the 
10th percentile (the “90/10 ratio”) and the 75th relative to the 25th percentile (the “75/25 ratio”).  The former 
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conveys a more dramatic contrast of the disparity between income groups whereas the latter is less so 
because the 75 percentile and the 25th percentiles are closer to the middle of the distribution.   
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Interestingly, the disparity between rich and poor declined over the recession and only now does it appear to 
be returning to historical levels.  
 
Figure 3 
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4.3 Polarization 
 
Table 2 shows the values of the Wolfson Index over the period studied.  Throughout the 2006-2010 – a 
period that includes a year both immediately prior to and immediately following the recession - there was an 
increase in income polarization of approximately 1.4 percent (CAGR).  But the index dropped during the 
actual recession period (2007-2009) by slightly more than half a percent (CAGR).  The table also shows the 
values of the standard error for the estimate of the Wolfson Index and the upper and lower bounds of a 95 
percent confidence interval.   
 
Table 2 
Income Polarization Based on the Wolfson Index 
Year Wolfson 
Index 
Standard 
Error 
LB 95% 
CI 
UB 95% 
CI 
2005 0.414 0.019 0.377 0.451 
2006 0.433 0.018 0.398 0.468 
2007 0.449 0.022 0.406 0.491 
2008 0.444 0.020 0.404 0.484 
2009 0.439 0.020 0.401 0.478 
2010 0.458 0.023 0.414 0.502 
2011 0.416 0.017 0.382 0.450 
2012 0.458 0.018 0.422 0.494 
Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census, Connecticut MSA’s.  
Based on occupant-adjusted family income in 2012 dollars 
 
Figure 4 provides a visual display of the Wolfson Index levels and the overlap among the associated 
confidence intervals.  One can rely on the graph for a visual determination of the statistical significance of 
any realized difference in the Polarization index for any two years.  
 
Figure 4 
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Table 3 shows the values in the realized difference in the Wolfson Polarization Index for every pair of years 
among the years between 2005 and 2012.  It also provides the associated t-statistic of the estimated change 
and the p-value. The p-value represents the likelihood that the observed difference in the realized levels of 
the polarization index is distinct from sampling noise and measurement error. 
 
Table 3 
Results of Hypothesis Test of No Change in the Wolfson Index 
Year   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2005 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
0.0188      
1.377        
0.175 
      
  
2006 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
  
0.0156       
0.9866       
0.3238 
0.0111       
0.755         
0.4503 
0.0061       
0.4289       
0.6679 
0.0249       
1.677         
0.0934 
  
2007 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
    
-0.0159     
-0.2676     
0.789 
-0.0091     
-0.5709     
0.5681 
0.0096       
0.5918       
0.5540 
  
2008 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
      
-0.0048     
-0.3197     
0.7492 
  
2009 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
0.0187       
1.225         
0.2207 
  
2010 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value 
-0.0422     
-2.8603     
0.0042 
  
2011 
Realized Change 
in Wolfson Index   
t-statistic                  
p-value             
0.0418      
2.854        
0.0043 
 
For example, the outcome for the null-hypothesis of no change in the Wolfson Index between the years of 
2006 and 2007 can be found inside the table above by locating of the base year located on the 2nd row (2006) 
and year 1 on the 2nd column (2007).  The realized change is 0.0156 and the associated t-statistic is 0.9866 
suggesting that the observed difference is not statistically significant from zero.  Accordingly, the null of no 
change cannot be rejected.  This result implies that the observed increase in the level of the Wolfson Index is 
not a statistically meaningful one.   
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4.4 Polarization and Income Inequality 
Table 4 lists the realized outcome of the Gini Coefficient for the State of Connecticut over the years 2005-
2012. The table also includes the standard error and the upper and lower bounds of a 95 percent confidence 
interval.   
 
Table 4 
Income Inequality Based on the Gini Coefficient 
State of Connecticut 
Year Gini Standard Error LB 95% CI 
UB 95% 
CI 
2005 0.454 0.007 0.441 0.467 
2006 0.484 0.007 0.471 0.497 
2007 0.499 0.007 0.486 0.512 
2008 0.485 0.006 0.473 0.498 
2009 0.472 0.006 0.461 0.483 
2010 0.489 0.005 0.479 0.500 
2011 0.472 0.007 0.458 0.486 
2012 0.497 0.007 0.483 0.511 
Source: Current Population Survey, Bureau of the Census, Connecticut MSA’s.  
Based on occupant-adjusted family income in 2012 dollars 
 
Figure 6 provides a visual display of the estimated Gini Coefficient for the year between 2005 and 2012.  
The figure also displays the overlap among the associated 95 percent confidence intervals.  One can rely on 
the graph for a visual determination of the statistical significance of any realized difference in inequality in 
the State of Connecticut for any two years.  
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 7 displays the realized trends in the values of the Wolfson Index and the Gini Coefficient.  Both 
indices have been normalized to equal 100 in 2005.  The normalized graph allows one to appraise whether 
the polarization metric is visually distinct from the inequality metric for the time period. It is clear that 
polarization is noticeably distinct from inequality.  Changes in the polarization metric appear to be more 
dramatic than the changes in the inequality index.   
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Throughout the period there were instances of increases as well decreases in polarization.  However, 
polarization in Connecticut does not increase, and in fact, appears to decline over the recession years: 2007 
to 2009.   
 
5.0 Comments 
In Connecticut polarization does not increase during the Great Recession – seemingly contrary to the official 
and public understanding of events and providing no support for allegations of a vanishing middle-class in 
the state. Why was there no increase in polarization? 
 
We have no conclusive explanation for the results obtained.  Our task was a largely exploratory one and 
limited to establishing the factual record of the impact of the recession on income polarization in the State of 
Connecticut. Nonetheless, we advance a tentative explanation as to our results.   
 
Income in Connecticut was already polarized, at least compared to other States. Connecticut has a one of the 
highest per capita incomes in the country. Part of the high income is due to a high level of education and part 
due to the proximity of New York City and the financial industry. There are many very high income 
individuals in the State. There are also some significant areas of poverty in inner cities (Hartford, New 
Haven, and Stamford, for example) and the combination of high income individuals and poverty leads to 
high levels of polarization. It could be that the level of polarization didn’t get worse because it was already 
high. Further work is necessary to convey a deeper examination into the relevance of this argument as an 
explanation for the results examined in this paper.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
The popular press often discusses the Great Recession increasing the disparity between “the rich” and “the 
poor,” or the differences between “the haves” and “have-nots” or any number of other popular descriptions 
alluding to the “disappearance,” the “hollowing out” or the “vanishing” of the middle class. These phrases, 
common in the vernacular, are studied in economics as instances of polarization or sorting.  They describe 
the extent to which society is grouped into two (or more) homogenous clusters around income, race, 
educational attainment or any other socio-economic characteristic.   
 
In this paper, using Bureau of the Census family income data we formally examine the polarization 
hypothesis for the State of Connecticut. The data are adjusted for nominal change in income and for 
variation in household size.  We ask and answer two questions.  First, did the polarization of income 
deteriorate over the recent recession?  If the observed clustering around two opposite poles that existed in 
Connecticut prior to the recession increased between the years immediately prior to the recession and 
immediately after (2006-2010) it would be consistent with the perception that the size of the middle class 
decreased over this period. Second, have income polarization and income inequality fared differently in the 
state? Income polarization and income inequality, albeit related, are generally distinct features of income 
distributions.  
 
Connecticut appears to have escaped the worst of the Great Recession. That is, the real, inflation- adjusted 
income of middle class households as measured by median family income consistently grew over the period 
of the Great Recession.  Moreover, there is no evidence of a statistically significant polarization of income 
over the recent recessionary period.  We also find that income inequality and income polarization followed 
distinct and different trajectories over the time period examined.  Our results are consistent with recent work 
with national data showing that “the evidence of a middle decline is far from clear” (Burkhauser, Larrimore, 
& Simon, 2012).  
 
Why is our appraisal important? The concern over the increase in polarization has moved beyond talk and 
debate.  At both federal and state levels – including the State of Connecticut - policymakers have started to 
articulate and deploy policies aiming at arresting any further middle-class slippage.  Policy in Connecticut 
appears to be based on an incorrect perception of an increase in income polarization and the sense that the 
middle class share of the economic pie is declining. Accordingly, establishing the factual record in a 
statistically robust manner is important for revising current policy and establishing future policy.   
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